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of digital technology devices has facilitated many instances of sexual
harassment.2 Such sexual harassment occurs through unprovoked and
offensive e-mails, messages posted on electronic bulletin boards, and
other means available on the Internet. To date, courts remain silent on
this issue. Should this type of sexual harassment be treated differently
from physical sexual harassment? The surprising answer is yes.
This Article suggests a new judicial framework for addressing sexual
harassment perpetrated through digital communications. This frame-
work accounts for the real-world technology in place in the digital
workplace and the legal framework that courts have constructed in con-
nection with affirmative defense to sexual harassment. The fundamental
difference between digital and physical sexual harassment is the employ-
er's ability to monitor and block offensive digital communications and
thus prevent digital sexual harassment. This possibility of prevention is
the underlying reason for treating the two forms of harassment differ-
ently and for modifying the existing affirmative defense.
This Article proposes that when an employer fails to use available
technology to prevent known digital sexual harassment issues, the af-
firmative defense should be modified or unavailable. Adopting this
approach would compel employers to use monitoring and blocking
technology as a way to eliminate digital sexual harassment in the work-
place.
INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment law has evolved greatly over the last few decades.
Employer liability has expanded to include liability for coworker har-
assment, supervisor harassment, and, most recently, third party
harassment. Correspondingly, courts have provided employers with
2. See Thomas J. Harvey, Beware Workplace E-Mail, Survey Says, ASAE & THE CENTER
FOR ASSOCIATION LEADERSHIP, http://www.asaecenter.org/PublicationsResources/
whitepaperdetail.cfm?ItemNumber= 12168 (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) (stating that
8.3% of companies in a recent survey claimed that they had battled a sexual harass-
ment or sex discrimination lawsuit based on employee e-mail or Internet use).
3. See Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1022-25 (9th Cit. 2005) (finding that an
employer may be responsible for actionable third party harassment of its employees);
Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that an employer may be responsible for sexual harassment toward employees by acts
of nonemployees); Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that an employer may be responsible for sexual harassment toward employ-
ees by acts of nonemployees); Rosenbloom v. Senior Res., Inc., 974 F. Supp. 738,
743-44 (D. Minn. 1997) ("employer can be held liable for the racial hostile work en-
vironment created by a third party"); Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp.
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specific defenses against this liability.' For example, an employer avoids
liability by taking corrective measures reasonably calculated to perma-
nently end the sexual harassment.' In many instances, the employer
cannot prevent the initial sexual harassment but may ensure that it does
not continue or recur.' This judicial treatment, however, provided little
comfort to sexual harassment victims because it did not require an em-
ployer to prevent the first instance of sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court, recognizing this insufficiency of redress, held
that employers should take preventive measures to ensure a workplace free
from sexual harassment consistent with Title VII's7 policy of encouraging
the creation of anti-sexual harassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms.' Although an employer cannot observe or control all the
actions of its employees in the physical workplace, the employer can more
practically prevent sexual harassment in the digital workplace because
cost-effective technology exists to actively monitor the content of digital
communication in e-mail, internet postings, instant messaging, and
other digital means.
Increasingly, sexually harassing conduct occurs through digital com-
munication channels,' even though employers have access to information
1024, 1028 (D. Nev. 1992) (holding that an employer may be liable for sexual har-
assment in the workplace of employees by non-employees). See generally Noah D.
Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggre-
gation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1357, 1372-73 (2009); Karen
Kaplowitz & Donald P. Harris, Third Party Sexual Harassment: Duties and Liabilities
ofEmployers, A.B.A. THE BRIEF, 32, 33-35 (Spring 1997).
4. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,.
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
5. See, e.g., Dunn v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding
that a hospital could be required to protect a nurse employee from harassment by a
doctor even though the doctor was not an employee of the hospital); Galdamez, 415
F.3d at 1022 ("An employer may be held liable for the actionable third-party harass-
ment of its employees where it ratifies or condones the conduct by failing to
investigate and remedy it after learning of it."). See also Kaplowirz & Harris, supra
note 3, at 36.
6. Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 3, at 38.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. %§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
8. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Paragher, 524 U.S. at 806. See also Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691;
Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002).
9. See Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *4-9 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (holding that an employee ter-
minated for sending harassing e-mails had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
work e-mail); McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4103, at *9-13 (Tex. App. May 28, 1999) (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in an employer-owned e-mail system). See also Daniel B. Gar-
rie & Matthew J. Armstrong, Comment, The Sarbanes-Oxey Act's Effect on Electronic
Discovery, FED. LAw., May 2005, at 51; Mitchell Waldman, Annotation, Expectation
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technology capable of preventing this conduct.'o Employers monitor and
block employees' digital communications to protect trade secrets," track
productivity, 2 and enforce corporate policies and procedures. 3 In light
of these uses-and, more importantly, the legal sanction of these us-
es'-employers should be required to monitor their internal networks
for offensive e-mails or communications that constitute sexual harass-
ment. Whether an employer took reasonable precautions with respect to
the size and scope of its existing domestic technological infrastructure
should determine its liability. These precautions should also bear directly
on the employer's ability to plead an affirmative defense to employee
allegations of digital workplace sexual harassment.
This Article recommends a new framework for courts to analyze
modern digital sexual harassment claims. Part I of the Article reviews the
existing legal remedies for sexual harassment, the employer's affirmative
defense, and the underlying rationale of the affirmative defense. Part II
critiques the application of the affirmative defense to the digital work-
place. Part III presents a new test, the Digital Workplace Defense Test,
which courts should invoke when reviewing an affirmative defense to
digital sexual harassment.
The proposed approach applies the affirmative defense in the digi-
tal workplace under more limited circumstances than in the physical
workplace. Courts should examine the defendant employer's technologi-
cal infrastructure and determine whether the employer and current
technology offerings were capable of monitoring and blocking the digi-
tal communications comprising the sexual harassment claim. The
employer should be permitted to plead the affirmative defense if the
employer lacked these capabilities. If, however, the court finds that the
existing technology did possess these capabilities, the court should then
explore whether the defendant took reasonable steps to monitor and
block the offensive digital communications, or whether the defendant's
of Privacy in Internet Communication, 92 A.L.R.5TH 15, § 3(c) (2001). But see
Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010) (finding that, under some
circumstances, employees do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in email ac-
cessed on a work computer).
10. See David N. Greenfield & Richard A. Davis, Lost in Cyberspace: The Web @ Work, 5
CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 347 (2002).
11. See Frank C. Morris, Jr., Workplace Privacy Issues: Avoiding Liability, in Employment
Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions in Federal and State Courts 697, 715 (ALI-
ABA Course of Study, June 3-5, 1999), available at WL SD52 ALI-ABA 697.
12. Id. at 713.
13. Id. at 725-26.
14. See Roland E. Kidwell & Robert Sprague, Electronic Surveillance in the Global
Workplace: Laws, Ethics, Research and Practice, 24 NEW TECH., WORK & EMp. 194,
198-99 (2009).
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failure to use readily available technology to prevent the sexual harass-
ment was reasonable. To resolve this inquiry, courts should determine
whether and to what extent the employer used such technology to mon-
itor and block communications for other purposes. If the court
concludes that the employer did not take reasonable steps to prevent the
sexual harassment, the court should not allow the defendant to plead the
affirmative defense." The adoption of this approach would appropriate-
ly place an obligation on employers who already possess and use
blocking and monitoring technology capable of culling out offensive
content to take reasonable preventive measures to prevent digital work-
place sexual harassment.
I. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Gender discrimination claims derive from Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.16 Congress enacted Title VII to protect employees
from discrimination based on gender, race, or religion in the work-
place. 7 Title VII establishes two different theories of liability for gender
discrimination and sexual harassment: (1) hostile work environment;
and (2) quid pro quo, or discriminatory acts having tangible employ-
18ment consequences.
A. Review ofLegal Remedies
A hostile work environment is created when the discriminatory
conduct of a supervisor, coworker, or third party alters the conditions of
an individual's employment and creates an abusive working dynamic.
Courts first recognized the hostile work environment cause of action in
race discrimination cases in the early 1980s.20 In Mentor Savings Bank v.
15. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cit. 1971); Snyder v. Guardian Auto.
Prod., Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872-74 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding in part that a
harassed female employee failed to establish that she was subjected to a hostile work
environment on the basis of her gender because anonymous computer messages tell-
ing her to "stop acting like you're actually working" did not reflect gender-based
motive or bias). See also Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 307 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir.
2002); Garcez v. Freightliner Corp., 188 Or. App. 397 (2003).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See generally Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 3, at 32.
20. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986); Rogers v. EEOC, 454
F.2d 234, 236-41 (5th Cir. 1971).
2012] 233
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Vinson,2 1 the Supreme Court extended the hostile work environment
cause of action to gender discrimination, noting that sexual harassment
constitutes a hostile work environment prohibited by Title VII. 22 The
Court recognized that the standard for imputing liability to an employer
for creating a hostile work environment differs depending on whether
the alleged harasser is a coworker, supervisor, or third party.23 When the
harasser is a coworker or third party, the employer is liable only if the
plaintiff can prove both that the employer knew of or should have
known of the sexual harassment, and that the employer failed to take
prompt and effective remedial action reasonably calculated to end the
sexual harassment.24 In essence, the employer's liability in this context is
determined in accordance with a negligence standard. However, the Su-
preme Court declined "to issue a definitive rule on employer liability" 25
when a supervisor's harassing conduct creates a hostile work environ-
26
ment. Instead, the Court stated that it "agree[d] with the [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission] that Congress wanted courts
to look to agency principles for guidance in this area." 27
The lack of a definitive standard for determining employer liability
for sexual harassment by supervisors initiated twelve years of disagree-
ment among the circuit courts. 28 This disagreement stemmed from the
circuit courts' differing applications of agency principles. The courts
held employers vicariously liable for supervisor misconduct according to
three different criteria: (1) if the supervisor was "aided by" the scope of
21. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.
22. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. See alo Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C.
1988) (finding supervisors' behavior created a hostile environment).
23. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793-801 (1998); Meritor, 477 U.S. at
72. See also Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 3, at 32, 34.
24. Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 380-81 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (citing
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cit. 1983)) (holding that the employer's re-
sponse to a complaint of sexual harassment fell short of prompt remedial action
reasonably calculated to end the harassment when the employer spoke to one alleged
harasser and placed a warning letter in the file of another alleged harasser, but failed
to inspect or discipline numerous other harassing employees); Kaplowitz & Harris,
supra note 3, at 36.
25. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
26. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (articulating that a hostile work environment was actionable
in sex discrimination cases because "the EEOC issued Guidelines specifying that
'sexual harassment,' as there defined, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Ti-
te VII.")
27. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Regarding quid pro quo harassment, which by definition is
committed by a supervisor or someone with power to effectuate tangible employment
actions, employers are strictly liable for supervisor harassment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at
808.
28. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786-87.
[Vol. 19:229234
LIMITING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
his or her employment; (2) if the supervisor was "aided by" the agency
relationship; or (3) if the employer had actual or constructive knowledge
of the sexual harassment and failed to remedy it.29 Some courts have also
held employers liable for supervisor misconduct on negligence grounds
for failing to prevent sexual harassment."
In order to resolve the disagreement among the circuit courts, the
Supreme Court established a new method for determining employer
liability in Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton3 1 and its companion case, Bur-
lington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.32 In these cases, the Court presented
two different standards for employer liability for sexual harassment by
supervisors. First, the Court held that an employer may be found liable
even if supervisor sexual harassment is not accompanied by an adverse
official act or "tangible employment action," such as discharge, demo-
tion, or undesirable reassignment." In these situations, however, the
employer may raise an affirmative defense to such liability." The affirm-
ative defense consists of two necessary elements: "(a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
29. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793.
30. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
employer liable where hotel manager did not respond to complaints about supervi-
sors' harassment); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding employer liable for harassment by coworkers because supervisor knew of the
harassment but did nothing); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (up-
holding employer liability because the "employer's supervisory personnel manifested
unmistakable acquiescence in or approval of the harassment"). See also Torres v. Pisa-
no, 116 F.3d 625, 634-35, 634 n.11 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Kotcher v. Rosa &
Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cit. 1992); Hunter v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986)) (noting that a supervisor
may hold a sufficiently high position "in the management hierarchy of the company
for his actions to be imputed automatically to the employer"); Nichols v. Frank, 42
F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cit. 1994) ("Under traditional agency principles, the exercise of
such actual or apparent authority gives rise to liability on the part of the employer
under a theory of respondeat superior." (citation omitted)); Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 62
("The supervisor is deemed to act on behalf of the employer when making decisions
that affect the economic status of the employee. From the perspective of the employ-
ee, the supervisor and the employer merge into a single entity."); Shager v. Upjohn
Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[A] supervisory employee who fires a sub-
ordinate is doing the kind of thing that he is authorized to do, and the wrongful
intent with which he does it does not carry his behavior so far beyond the orbit of his
responsibilities as to excuse the employer.").
31. Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
32. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Elerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
33. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
34. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."35 Second, the
Court held that an employer must be found strictly liable if the supervi-
sor's sexual harassment is accompanied by an adverse official act or
tangible employment action. Under these circumstances, the em-
ployer may not raise the affirmative defense." When a perceptible and
hostile employment action accompanies sexual harassment, strict liability
and the unavailability of the affirmative defense are appropriate for a vari-
ety of reasons: the supervisor's decision and act "merges" with the
employer; the supervisor acts within the scope of his or her authority
when he or she hires, fires, or demotes the employee; and the supervisor is
aided by the agency relationship in discriminating against the employee.
B. The Rationale Behind the Supreme Court's
Creation of the Affirmative Defense
The Supreme Court reasoned that the availability of an affirmative
defense would provide an incentive for employers to take both preven-
tive and remedial measures to limit occurrences of sexual harassment in
the workplace." Examples of such measures include instituting a griev-
ance procedure, educating employees and supervisors about sexual
harassment, and ensuring that employees are notified of their rights re-
garding sexual harassment.
By holding that employers can be vicariously liable for supervisors'
conduct, the Court recognized that employers are in the best position to
prevent sexual harassment, a clear goal of Title VII.' The Court also
recognized that employers are not the only actors who can curtail sexual
harassment."0 Thus, while the first prong of the affirmative defense im-
poses an obligation on employers to prevent sexual harassment from
occurring, the second prong imposes an obligation on employees to take
actions to minimize resulting harm.
35. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
36. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
37. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
38. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777. See Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 226 (2d Cir.
2004); Pfeiffer v. Lewis Cnty., 308 F. Supp. 2d 88, 106 (N.D.N.Y. 2004); Sutton v.
Zemex Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 392, 395 (W.D.N.Y. 2003); Sconce v. Tandy Corp.,
9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 777 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
39. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 798, 806 ("[Title VII's] 'primary objective' ... is not to pro-
vide redress but to avoid harm.") (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 417 (1975)). See also Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield 480 F.3d 1287, 1305
(11th Cit. 2007); Swenson v. Potter 271 F.3d 1184, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001); Hatha-
way v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1224 (8th Cit. 1997).
40. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07.
[Vol. 19:229236
LIMITING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
While the Supreme Court did not explicitly direct employers to
adopt internal anti-sexual harassment policies and procedures, the Su-
preme Court provided an incentive to do so by granting employers
possible immunity if they implement policies and procedures." In ex-
plaining why employer liability for supervisor misconduct might be
appropriate, the Court justified the different treatment between supervi-
sors, on the one hand, and coworkers and third parties, on the other,
because a supervisor "[njecessarily draw[s] upon his superior position" in
harassing the victim and because the employer has a greater opportunity
to guard against supervisor misconduct.42 The Court refused to impute
"automatic liability" for supervisor sexual harassment because liability
might be inappropriate under certain conditions, such as when the em-
ployer exercised due care to avoid sexual harassment and to eliminate it
when it occurred.
C The Affirmative Defense Today
In 2004, in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the affirmative defense in the context of a constructive dis-
charge claim.44 In Suders, a female police dispatcher for the Pennsylvania
State Police filed a claim against her employer alleging both sexual har-
assment and gender discrimination. She claimed constructive discharge
by alleging that relentless sexual harassment by her supervisors left her
41. See, e.g., Hairston-Lash v. R.J.E. Telecom, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (E.D. Pa.
2001) (granting summary judgment for the defendant employer, stating that plaintiff
did not contest that she had received notice of employer's extensive policies and pro-
cedures on handling sexual harassment); Slay v. Glickman, 137 F. Supp. 2d 743, 752
(S.D. Miss. 2001) (granting employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding,
because the employer had a sexual harassment policy of which the plaintiff was aware
and promptly investigated plaintiffs allegations of harassment, plaintiff did not estab-
lish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the defendant employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct sexual harassment in the
workplace). See also Donald P. Harris, Daniel B. Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong, Sex-
ual Harassment: Limiting the Affirmative Defense in the, Digital Workplace, 39 U.
MicH. J.L. REFORm 73 (2005).
42. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803. See also Joens v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940
(8th Cir. 2004); Gordon v. Shafer Contracting Co., 469 F.3d 1191, 1194-95 (8th
Cit. 2006); Al-Zubaidy v. TEK Indus., Inc., 406 F.3d 1030, 1038 (8th Cir. 2005).
43. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805.
44. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 131 (2004). See also Ford Motor
Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982) (discussing a Title VII plaintiffs responsi-
bility to mitigate damages).
45. Suders, 542 U.S. at 133.
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no option but to resign her position. Reversing the trial court's deci-
sion, the Third Circuit held that her constructive discharge constituted
an adverse employment action. Therefore, under Faragher and Ellerth,
her employer was strictly liable and not permitted to plead the affirma-
tive defense."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although some con-
structive discharges amounted to official employer action, others do not
result from a supervisor's official act. Accordingly, the Court concluded
that an employer is prohibited from relying on the "affirmative defense
[only] when a supervisor's official act precipitates the constructive dis-
charge . . . .'o Although Suders reinforces the role of the affirmative
defense in the physical workplace, Suders does not address whether the
affirmative defense should be permitted in the digital workplace.'
11. CRITIQUE OF THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
IN THE DIGITAL WORKPLACE
Digital workplace sexual harassment occurs when employees use e-
mail or the Internet to sexually harass other employees or to create a
hostile work environment.52 Few cases have addressed employer liability
for these acts. In Owens v. Morgan Stanley ' Co., the district court held
that while unchecked offensive e-mail communications circulating with-
in the workplace could constitute sexual harassment, a single incident of
inappropriate e-mail was insufficient to establish a claim." In Strauss v.
Microsoft Corp., the district court held that jokes and sexual parodies, in
46. Suders, 542 U.S. at 133.
47. Suders, 542 U.S. at 138.
48. Suders, 542 U.S. at 139.
49. Suders, 542 U.S. at 131.
50. Suders, 542 U.S. at 140-41.
51. Suders, 542 U.S. at 148. See also Mac's Shell Serv., Inc. v. Shell Oil Prod. Co., 130 S.
Ct. 1251, 1258 (2010); Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d
712, 725 (2d Cir. 2010).
52. See Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 102 (2nd Cir. 2010); Strick-
land v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 555 F.3d 1224, 1233 (10th Cir. 2010); Helton v.
Southland Racing Corp., 600 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2010); Blakey v. Cont'l Air-
lines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 551-52 (N.J. 2000); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of
Internet Service Provider for Internet or E-mail Defamation, 84 A.L.R. 5th 169, § 4(b)
(2000).
53. Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 CIV. 9747, 1997 WL 403454, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1997). See also Martin v. MTA Bridges & Tunnels, 610 F. Supp.
2d 238, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Lueck v. Progressive Ins., Inc., No. 09-CV-6174,
2009 WL 342979, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009).
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combination with other remarks e-mailed by a supervisor to employees,
were admissible and relevant evidence of sexual harassment.54
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Blakey v. Continental, Inc.,
held that a female employee had a valid sexual harassment claim when
allegedly defamatory and sexually harassing material was posted on an
electronic bulletin board." Although the employer, Continental, did
not maintain the bulletin board and employees could only access it
through the Internet, the court found that Continental had notice of
the sexual harassment and that the electronic bulletin board was inte-
grated into the workplace to such a degree that Continental had a duty
to correct off-site sexual harassment by coworkers." Blakey stressed that
an employer's responsibility to prevent sexual harassment and hostile
work environments extends to both the physical and digital workplace. 7
Under Blakey, once an employer has knowledge of employee-to-
employee digital sexual harassment, the employer must take affirmative
steps to halt the sexual harassment.
The Blakey court, however, did not place an affirmative obligation
on employers to prevent sexual harassment by monitoring digital
communications. The court stated that although "employers do not
have a duty to monitor private communications of their employees,"
they "do have a duty to take effective measures to stop co-employee
harassment when the employer knows or has reason to know" of the
54. Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 91 CIV. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y.
June 1, 1995).
55. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 543. In Blakey, a female pilot claimed that she suffered from a
hostile work environment by being the subject of a series of harassing and defamatory
messages posted on an internet bulletin board accessible to all Continental pilots and
crew members. Id. at 544. See also Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256,
259 (4th Cir. 2002); Bible & Gospel Trust v. Wyman, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030
(D. Minn. 2005); Burleson v. Toback, 391 F. Supp. 2d 401, 417 (M.D.N.C. 2005);
Medinah Mining, Inc. v. Amunategui, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1136 (D. Nev. 2002);
Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 729 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Novak v.
Benn, 896 So. 2d 513, 521 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d
527, 530 (Minn. 2002); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 928 A.2d 948, 950 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2007); Doe v. XYZ Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1162 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2005) (repeating that companies have no duty to investigate the private com-
munications of their employees); Lafranco v. Avaya, Inc., Docket No. A-1666-06T2,
2009 WL 2850747, at *29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sep. 8, 2009).
56. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 543, 551-52, 558.
57. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 551.
58. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 551-52.
59. AMA/ePolicy Inst. Research, 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey 2 (2008),
http://www.plattgroupllc.com/junO8/2007ElectronicMonitoringSurvelalanceSurvey.pdf
(stating that 71 percent of employers monitoring employee e-mail notify such employ-
ees prior to any monitoring; 11 percent of employers do not notify employees; another
18 percent did not know whether e-mail monitoring took place).
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sexual harassment."o The court limited the scope of its holding due to
"grave privacy concerns."" Recent decisions and legislative enactments
have reduced these concerns and suggest extending the reach of the
decision.
A. Monitoring Technology in the Workplace
Courts have recognized employers' rights to monitor employees' e-
mail messages and to use digital technologies to protect trade secrets.62
Moreover, courts have consistently found that employees do not have an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when their employer's e-mail
policies notify employees that the employer may monitor their e-mail or
internet use.63 Employers have a right to invade employees' digital work-
60. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 552; see also Herman v. Coastal Corp., 791 A.2d 238, 251-52
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (finding no employer liability absent showing that
harassing employee operated within scope of employment and that employer acted
negligently or intentionally and/or failed to take effective remedial measures).
61. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 551. See also Tacket v. Gen. Motors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042, 1046
(7th Cir. 1987; Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156 (N.J. App. Div 2005)).
62. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 551. See also Eric P. Robinson, Big Brother or Modern Manage-
ment: E-mail Monitoring in the Private Workplace, 17 LAB. LAW. 311, 325-26 (2001).
Contra Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010) (find-
ing that employees do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in email accessed on a
work computer).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Greiner, 235 Fed. Appx. 541, 542 (9th Cit. 2007) (holding
that an employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy because he consented to
employer monitoring when he was confronted by a warning banner each time he
logged onto his computer); United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th
Cir. 2007) (stating that "privacy expectations may be reduced if the user is advised
that information transmitted through the network is not confidential and that the
systems administrators may monitor communications transmitted by the user"). See
also Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. %§ 2701-2711 (2000); Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 409 (2d Cir. 2004); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002); Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 319
F. Supp. 2d 468, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 878, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., Inc., 847
N.Y.S.2d 436, 444 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); Loving Care, 990 A.2d at 687-88 (holding
that "Stengart had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mails she exchanged
with her attorney on Loving Care's laptop. Stengart plainly took steps to protect the
privacy of those e-mails and shield them from her employer. She used a personal, pass-
word-protected e-mail account instead of her company e-mail address and did not save
the account's password on her computer. In other words, she had a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in messages to and from her lawyer discussing the subject of a future
lawsuit. In light of the language of the Policy and the attorney-dient nature of the
communications, her expectation of privacy was also objectively reasonable. As noted
earlier, the Policy does not address the use of personal, web-based email accounts ac-
cessed through company equipment. It does not address personal accounts at all. Nor
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spaces because employers have legitimate interests in communications
transmitted on their digital networks for a multitude of reasons:( to en-
65 66
sure work productivity, to prevent trade secret disclosure, to ensure
compliance with federal regulations, to prevent transmission of defam-
atory statements, and to prevent transmission of unauthorized or illegal
material over employers' digital communication networks, 6 among oth-
70er reasons.
does it warn employees that the contents of e-mails sent via personal accounts can be
forensically retrieved and read by the company. Indeed, in acknowledging that occa-
sional personal use of e-mail is permitted, the Policy created doubt about whether
those e-mails are company or private property. Moreover, the e-mails are not illegal
or inappropriate material stored on Loving Care's equipment, which might harm the
company in some way."); William A. Herbert, Symposium, The Electronic Workplace:
To Live Outside the Law you Must be Honest, 12 EMPL. RTs. & EMPLOY. POL' YJ. 49,
60-61 (2008) (stating that "automatic screen warnings, upon logging in, can help to
ensure that an employee's subjective expectation of privacy will be found unreasona-
ble by a court."). See generally, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Cr. 2619 (2010);
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F. 3d 892 (9th Cit. 2008); Justin Con-
forti, Somebody's Watching Me: Workplace Privacy Interests, Technology Surveillance,
and the Ninth Circuit' Misapplication of the Ortega Test in Quon v. Arch Wireless, 5
SETON HALL CIR. REv. 461, 472-91 (2009); Paul F. Gerhart, Employee Privacy Rights
in the United States, 17 Comp. LAB. L.J. 175, 176-205 (Fall 1995); James P. Nehf,
Incomparability and the Passive Virtues ofAd Hoc Privacy Policy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
1, 4-18 (2005); Rachel Sweeney Green, COMMENTS: Privacy in the Government
Workplace: Employees'Fourth Amendment and Statutory Rights to Privacy, 35 CUMB. L.
REv. 639 (2004-2005).
64. See United States v. Zeigler, 456 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cit. 2006); Muick v. Gle-
nayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cit. 2002) (holding that the abuse of access
using workplace computers is so common that "reserving a right of inspection is'so
far from being unreasonable that the failure to do so might well be thought irrespon-
sible"); United States v. Silva, 247 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cit. 2001) (noting that
"[the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy is evaluated ... [by reference] 'to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society"' [quoting Rakas v. Illi-
nois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.1 2 (1978)]). See also Daniel B. Garrie & Rebecca Wong,
Demystifying Clickstream Data: A European and U.S. Perspective, 20 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 563, 570 (2006).
65. Morris, supra note 11, at 702.
66. Id.
67. ORACLE FINANCIAL SERVICES, ORACLE FINANcLAL SERVICES TRADING COMPLIANCE 1
(2011), http://www.oracle.com/us/industries/financial-services/046172.pdf. Benjamin
Wright, E-Message Retention Under US Securities Law, MESSAGINGARCHITECTS.COM,
http://www.messagingarchitects.com/documents/pdflResourcesleDiscovery%20Centre
%20Free%2OResources/SEC_-Compliance brief.pdf.
68. See Kirstie Ball, Workplace Surveillance:An Overview, 51 LA. HIsT. 87, 92 (2010).
69. See Amy Rogers, You Got Mail But Your Employer Does Too: Electronic Communica-
tion and Privacy in the 21st Century Workplace, 5 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 9-30 (2000).
70. See Marc A. Sherman, Webmail at Work: The Case for Protection Against Employer
Monitoring, 23 ToURo L. REv. 647, 651 (2007-2008) (stating that a "short list of
other risks [of not monitoring employee e-mail] includes compromise of sensitive or
2412012]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
The vast majority of large employers use digital tracking technology
to monitor employees. 71 According to a recent Washington Internet Daily
release, 80 percent of major United States companies occasionally record
and review employees' electronic communications or browser use. 72 67
percent of employers have disciplined at least one employee for improper
or excessive use of e-mail or internet access, and 31 percent have fired
employees for such conduct. It is estimated that more than three-
quarters of major U.S. corporations record and review employee
communications and activities on the job, including telephone calls,
e-mail, internet communications, and computer files." E-mail
monitoring by employers is both a necessity and a legally recognized
right. Courts granted employers this right so employers can prevent
personal use or abuse of company resources, investigate corporate
espionage and theft, resolve technical problems, and better cooperate
with law enforcement officials in investigations.76
Many companies also use software that monitors or blocks their
employees' use of the corporate technology infrastructure. SilentRun-
proprietary information, damage to public image, and vicarious liability for various
torts").
71. Employers Fighting Net Abuse Must Mind Privacy, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Apr. 24,
2002, at 1.
72. Id. Numerous providers offer a myriad array of employee monitoring software; the
following is an incomplete list: StaffCop, by AtomPark Software Inc.; OfficeShield,
by Computer Business Solutions, Inc.; Spector 360, by SpectorSoft Corp.; and
GuardBay, by Interlative LLC. These solutions generally include keylogging, capture
of instant messages, email, and social networking usage, file transfer recording,
screenshot capture, and program usage, for example.
73. Id.
74. AMA, Electronic Policies and Practices: Summary of Key Findings, US NEWS (2001),
http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/emsshort2001.pdf.
75. See generally Jennifer J. Griffin, The Monitoring ofElectronic Mail in the Private Sector
Workplace: An Electronic Assault on Employee Privacy Rights, 4 SOFTWARE L.J. 493,
502 (1991).
76. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1046 (11th Cit. 2003); Konop v. Ha-
waiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002); Pure Power Boot Camp v.
Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Greenfield
& Davis, supra note 10, at 348.
77. See generally Ed Orum, 10 Ways Your Employer is Spying on You,(Dec. 27, 2009)
http://jobs.aol.com/articles/2009/12/27/10-ways-your-employer-is-spying-on-you;
Stephanie Armour, Employers Look Closely at What Workers do on Job, USA
TODAY, (Nov. 7, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/
2006- 11-07-spy-cover-usatx.htm; Richard Hull et al., Enabling Context-Aware
and Privacy-Conscious User Data Sharing, IEEE INT'L CONF. ON MOBILE DATA
MGMT., Jan. 19-22, 2004, at 187; R. H. Irving et al., Computerized Performance
Monitoring Systems: Use and Abuse, 29 CoMM. AcM 794, 798 (1986); Pete
Lindstrom, Diverse Security Technologies Deliver the Same Message: "Keep Out!",
INFo. SECURITY, Oct. 2002, available at http:// www.infosecuritymag.com/2002/oct/
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ner is illustrative of such software." Although most lawyers and employ-
ees have never heard of SilentRunner, companies and governmental
agencies use the program to monitor their agents and employees.o Ac-
cording to Susan Lee, a representative for the internet security assurance
service provider TruSecure, SilentRunner provides constant employee
monitoring for nearly four hundred companies." Organizations such as
Deloitte & Touche that use SilentRunner and similar software,82 have
adopted top-secret policies" regarding their use of the product." Such
an approach enables companies to avoid public scrutiny from groups
sidebar.shtml; M. Tamuz, The Impact of Computer Surveillance on Air Safety Reporting,
22 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 69, 75 (1987).
78. SilentRunner, now called SilentRunner Sentinel and sold by the AccessData Corpora-
tion, is capable of recognizing approximately 2000 different protocols. Jay Lyman,
SilentRunner Spyware Out-Snoops FBI's Carnivore, NEWSFACTOR, Mar. 2, 2001, avail-
able at http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml? story-id=7873. It can collect any
traffic on the network at a rate of 195,000 plus packets per second. Jeffrey Benner,
Nailing the Company Spies, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 1, 2001, available at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0, 1367,41968,00.htrml (quoting Dave Capuano, Vice
President of Product Management for TruSecure); see also J. Rule & P. Brantly, Sur-
veillance in the Workplace: A New Meaning to 'Personal' Computing, PROC. INT'L
CONF. ON SHAPING ORG., SHAPING TECH., 1991, at 183.
79. See Jeffrey Benner, Privacy at Work? Be Serious, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 1, 2001, available
at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,42029,00.html; see also Benner, su-
pra note 78 ("In 1999, Raytheon took action against some of its own employees it
suspected of compromising company information. Some of them learned the hard
way that talking about one's employer 'privately,' and even anonymously, can be
risky. In February of that year, Raytheon sued 21 'John Does' for $25,000 in damag-
es due to criticisms of the company made on Internet message boards. Raytheon said
it suspected current and former employees of being responsible for the anonymous
postings, accusing them of revealing confidential information. The company success-
fully subpoenaed Yahoo to find out who made the comments, then abruptly dropped
the suit. At least four of the 21, including one VP, resigned after being identified.").
80. Benner, supra note 79; see also Kristie Lu Stout, China Police Unleash Net Filterware,
CNN, Mar. 1, 2001, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/
east/02/28/hk.policefilter/index.html.
81. Benner, supra note 79.
82. Id. ("'SilentRunner is completely undetectable to end users, and it captures every-
thing,' said Kris Haworth, manager of the Deloitte & Touche computer forensics lab
in San Francisco."). See generally Detmar W. Straub, Jr. & William D. Nance, Dis-
covering and Disciplining Computer Abuse in Organizations: A Field Study, 14 MIS Q.
45, 47 (1990).
83. See Andrew Gumbel, Techno Detectives Net Cyber-Stalkers, INDEP., Jan. 31, 1999, at
17.
84. Benner, supra note 79 ("Until December 2000, when security services provider
TruSecure revealed it had purchased the 'lite' version of the program, not one
organization, public or private, had admitted to buying SilentRunner. On Feb. 1, the
computer forensic division of consulting firm Deloitte & Touche became the second to
say it uses the program.").
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concerned about the erosion of privacy in the workplace." Although the
effort to maintain secrecy about the configuration of monitoring soft-
ware may seem to indicate that such monitoring is dishonest or
immoral, whether it is unethical depends on the reasonable expectations
of employees. When employers' policies indicate clearly that monitoring
takes place, employees have little or no expectation of privacy." When
employees are not notified of these policies, the question of reasonable
expectations is debatable.
In addition to monitoring and blocking capabilities, employers of-
ten possess a high degree of control over employee computer desktops
by ensuring that a uniform technical environment exists to maximize
productivity.8' For example, ActivatorDesk's Enterprise Desktops Con-
troller monitors employee computing activities and compares them to a
list of approved activities. If an employee performs previously unap-
proved activities, 'ActivatorDesk can instantly implement a 'lock-down
policy"' while sending network administrators an e-mail alert of the vio-
lation."o Today, monitoring tools are common and available. For
example, parents can utilize the stealth and anti-detection capabilities of
"Spector Pro 2011" to monitor their children's activity on: the latest
chat programs, such as Google Talk, Skype Chat/IM, and the latest ver-
sions of AIM, MSN, and Yahoo; webmail from Google Gmail,
Microsoft Hotmail, Yahoo Mail, and AOL Mail; and Facebook and
85. See generally Mary J. Culnan, Protecting Privacy Online: Is Self-Regulation Working?,
19 J. Pun. POL'Y & MARKETING 20, 20-26 (2000). While the authors strongly believe
that privacy concerns should trump employer concerns, the point of this section is to
demonstrate that courts have permitted employers to use such monitoring and track-
ing devices despite employee privacy concerns. Whether this is appropriate is not the
subject of this Article.
86. See Kidwell & Sprague, supra note 14, at 198-99.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 196.
89. Michelle Delio, New Tools a Spying Boss Will Love, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 13, 2002,
available at http://www.wired.com/news /privacy/0, 1 848,56324,00.html.
90. Id. See also Wallace Immen, Workplace Privacy Gets Day in Court, GLOBE & MAIL,
Apr. 28, 2004, at Cl. On a different note, however, regarding the dangers of remote
webcam access see Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-0665, 2010 WL
1976869 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2010). In Robbins, school administrators installed
webcam-monitoring software on laptops issued to students. They then used the soft-
ware to spy on students at home, including keylogging, webcam access, and site
access logging.
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MySpace." Enhanced versions of these monitoring applications are read-
ily available for corporate networks.92
The majority of large corporate employers in the United States cur-
rently use monitoring and blocking software that allows them to observe
and block inappropriate digital communications over corporate infor-
mation technology networks before the intended recipient receives
them." Employers exercise this power without also being required to
protect their employees. As a result, employees are relinquishing privacy
rights without receiving the benefit of the employer's protection in re-
turn. Due to the diminished expectation of privacy in the workplace,
employees are entitled to bring suit only when an intrusion infringes
upon intensely private matters or when their employers have failed to
94
inform them of the monitoring.
The Second Circuit illustrated the diminished expectation of priva-
cy in the workplace in Leventhal v. Knapek, holding that an employee
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his or
her digital activities in the workplace." In support of the same principle,
91. Costs are less than $100 per computer. See SpectorSoft, Products, http://www.
spectorsoft.com/products/SpectorPro-Windows/index.asp?refer= 12081 (last visited
Sept. 25, 2011).
92. Delio, supra note 89.
93. See Robinson, supra note 62, at 325
94. "No comprehensive statutory scheme supplements the common law to provide pro-
tection for employees' privacy or even simply from employer monitoring. Instead, a
variety of federal and state laws offer only targeted and limited protections . . . ." Ari-
ana R. Levinson, Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18 CORNELL J.
L. & PuB. POL'Y 609, 620-21, (2009). "Moreover, because the Fourth Amendment
only applies when the government acts, private sector employees have [basically] no
statutory federal protection. While the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 protects against various kinds of electronic surveillance and interception of
communications by public and private actors . . . this regime presents several poten-
tially insurmountable hurdles for any employee who alleges his employer intercepted
private communications on workplace technology." Conforti, supra note 63, at 465.
For case law, see Med. Lab. Mgmt. v. ABC, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (D.
Ariz. 1998); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (finding employer may have intruded on an employee's privacy by reading per-
sonal medical documents on employee's desk). See also Craig v. M & 0 Agencies,
Inc., 496 F. 3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007); Mindy C. Calisti, You Are Being Watched: The
Needfor Notice in Employer Electronic Monitoring, 96 Ky. L.J. 649 (2007-08); Con-
forti, supra note 63, at 464 (reiterating that if "employers monitor communications
on workplace technology and employees inadvertently divulge personal information,
employees will often struggle to find any legal protection, as the American legal re-
gime does not provide any generally applicable, affirmative protection for employee
privacy.").
95. Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cit. 2001). But see US v. Heckenkamp,
482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) ("However, privacy expectations may be re-
duced if the user is advised that information transmitted through the network is not
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Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA)9' and the Stored Communications Act (SCA),9" both of which
grant employers the right to monitor employees' e-mail communications
as long as the monitoring occurs in the ordinary course of business."
The majority of case law interpreting the ECPA has found that employ-
ers can monitor employees' e-mail messages with or without consent,
and even without notice.99
confidential and that the systems administrators may monitor communications
transmitted-by the user."); United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cit. 2000); Matikas v.
Univ. of Dayton, 788 N.E.2d 1108, 1115 (Ohio App. 2003) (holding an employer
accessing employee's private information on employer's computer is actionable).
96. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). The ECPA, enacted
nearly a decade before the creation of the World Wide Web, did not anticipate the
contemporary monitoring technology which primarily involves the Web, see Konop
v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "the diffi-
culty [in deciding how the ECPA must apply to contemporary technology] is
compounded by the fact that the ECPA was written prior to the advent of the Inter-
net and the World Wide Web. As a result, the existing statutory framework is ill-
suited to address modern forms of communication like [this] secure website. Courts
have struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology within the confines
of this statutory framework, often with unsatisfying results."). See also United States
v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 833 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting United States v.
Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 200 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[T]he language of the [Wiretap
Act] makes clear that Congress meant to give lesser protection to electronic commu-
nications than wire and oral communications. Moreover, at this juncture, much of
the protection may have been eviscerated by the realities of modern technology. [In
fact] . . . the language may be out of step with the technological realities of computer
crimes.")).
97. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-68
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000)).
98. See Daniel B. Garrie, The Legal Status of Software, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFo. L. 711, 732-35 (2005); Daniel B. Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong & Donald P.
Harris, Voice Over Internet Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protect-
ed?, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 97, 108-11 (2005).
99. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004); Fraser v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins., 352 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cit. 2003); United States v. Angevine,
281 F.3d 1130, 1134-35 (10th Cit. 2002) (holding that the professor, who had en-
tered a conditional plea for downloading child pornography to his workplace
computer, had no expectation of privacy in his use of his public employer's comput-
er, especially since the university's usage and monitoring policy was displayed upon
login); KLA-Tencor Corp. v. Murphy, 717 F. Supp. 2d 895, 903 (N.D. Cal 2010);
United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770 (C.D. Ill. 2009); In re Dou-
bleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United
States v. Bunnell, No. CRIM.02-13-B-S, 2002 WL 981457, at *2 (D. Me. May 10,
2002) ("A [public university] student has no generic expectation of privacy for shared
usage on the university's computers.").
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These judicial and congressional actions have expanded employ-
ers' ability to monitor employee's electronic communications without
violating federal privacy laws.' 00 Because employers have access and
control over employee's electronic communications, employers are now
in a position to minimize digital sexual harassment in the workplace.'
For example, employers can block e-mails containing sexually explicit
terms and restrict wallpaper settings on corporate computers so users
cannot display inappropriate or offensive material; they might also
monitor employee use of social networking sites; and they could review
phone calls, text messages, and data use on a company-issued mobile
phone.102 The ability and the right to monitor all employee digital
transmissions places employers in an ideal position to take simple, pro-
active measures to prevent most instances of digital sexual harassment.
The rights and abilities of employers to read digital communications
sent and received by employees should compel courts to extend the hold-
ings of Ellerth and Faragher, as well as the Blakey line of cases. Because
employers who use blocking and monitoring technology have notice of
potential digital sexual harassment before it reaches the intended recipi-
ent, employers should bear the burden to provide reasonably sufficient
technical protection that limits exposure to such sexual harassment. o0
100. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 72-76.
102. The author believes that there is a difference between what can be called "internet
monitoring" and what can be called "social network monitoring." Social network
monitoring-when done at work-falls clearly under internet monitoring. The use of
a social network by an employee on a work computer involves access to the site via
the internet and is part of internet monitoring. Instead, the author views "social net-
work monitoring" as browsing through an employee's Facebook page or Twitter
stream, etc. or conducting a search of an employee's name to discover information.
See further John Browning, Employers Face Pros, Cons With Monitoring Social Net-
working, HousToN Bus. J., (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/
stories/2009/03/02/smallb3.html ("On Oct. 31, 2007, Kevin Colvin told his em-
ployers at Boston's Anglo Irish Bank that he had to miss a day of work due to an
emergency at home in New York. The next day, Colvin's manager happened to check
the employee's Facebook profile, where Colvin had thoughtfully posted a photograph
from a Halloween party he had attended the previous night, featuring him in a spark-
ly green fairy costume, complete with wand and a can of beer. Colvin's manager
replied to an e-mail from his soon-to-be ex-employee, attaching the photo of Colvin
in drag-and blind copying the entire office-and stating 'Thanks for letting us
know-hope everything is okay in New York (cool wand).' Colvin was fired for ly-
ing.")
103. See generally United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cit. 2007);
United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Si-
mons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Butler, 151 F. Supp. 2d 82,
84 (D. Me. 2001) (finding student had no objective expectation of privacy in using
university computers even absent evidence of a university policy giving notice of right
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Unfortunately, courts have not bridged the gap between employers'
freedom to monitor employee acts and employers' responsibility to pre-
vent employee acts capable of causing harm. More precisely, many
courts have yet to address whether an employer should be entitled to
plead an affirmative defense to digital sexual harassment claims when
the employer has failed to monitor the digital work environment, pre-
vent digital sexual harassment, or institute mechanisms to facilitate
employee complaints of digital sexual harassment. o
B. The Current Affirmative Defense Framework Undermines
both Congressional and judicial Policies
Although the Supreme Court in Ellerth'O' and Faraghero' sought to
compel employers to take a preventive approach to eliminate sexual har-
assment in the workplace, an employer pleading the affirmative defense
may be able to avoid accountability for hostile digital work environ-
ments. The failure to require preemptive policies in the digital sphere -is
particularly inappropriate when employers have effective notice of sex-
ually harassing communications.' The inappropriateness of this
position also violates the Supreme Court's intent to compel employers to
take a proactive role in preventing workplace sexual harassment. Moreo-
ver, the docket of both state and federal courts is likely to grow until the
or intent to monitor use). Contra Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-
0665 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2010) (discussed supra note 90).
104. See supra notes 53-57. See also Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1169-70 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (holding that an employer might avoid vicarious liability
when one of its employees transmits child pornography at work and the employer
had policies against such activities). In Doe, the employer knew of the illegal activities
and did little to nothing to shut them down or discipline the employee. Id. at 1158.
The appellate court remanded the case for a jury trial but likely would have dismissed
the employer from the case had management enforced its Internet policy. See id.
105. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
106. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
107. The EEOC declared that twelve Minneapolis librarians were subjected to a sexually
hostile work environment when they were exposed to pornography accessed on the
Internet by library patrons. See, e.g., EEOC Rules in Minneapolis PL Complaint,
AM. LIBR. ONLINE (May 28, 2001), http://www.ala.org/ala/alonline/currentnews/
newsarchive/2001/may2001 (follow "EEOC Rules in Minneapolis PL Complaint"
hyperlink). If courts agree with the EEOC, all libraries, public and private, will
need to ban Internet access to "offensive" sites or face hostile environment liability.
See, e.g., Five More Minneapolis Librarians File Discrimination Charges, AM. LIBR.
ONLINE (May 29, 2000), http://www.ala.org/ala/alonline/currentnews/newsarchive/
2000/may2000/fivemoreminneapolis.htm.
[Vol. 19:229248
LIMITING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
issues arising from digital sexual harassment are addressed.'o Courts
should therefore apply the Faragher and Ellerth affirmative defense to
protect employees in the digital workplace by creating an efficient and
effective legal framework to address digital sexual harassment claims.
While a judicial approach to the problem would not preclude legislative
action, the Supreme Court's willingness to address sexual harassment in
cases such as Meritor and Ellerth indicates the courtroom as the natural
locus for the framework's development.
The existing affirmative defense focuses on the employer's remedial
measures and the employee's availment of these corrective opportunities.
This assessment approach, although perhaps effective in the physical
workplace, does not account for the technology available in the digital
workplace today. Employers in the digital workplace have the ability to
"know everything" and can control digital communications to stop sex-
ual harassment before it occurs. The increased monitoring capabilities of
employers in the digital workplace call for a modification of the affirma-
tive defense in cases of digital sexual harassment.'o9
C The Affirmative Defense in the Digital Workplace
Employers should be required to institute more than remedial poli-
cies in order to plead the affirmative defense if they already use a wide
108. Digital sexual harassment is not limited to the workplace and numerous organizations
are taking steps to combat its presence in all areas of life. See M7V Launches A Thin
Line' To Stop Digital Abuse, MTV (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.mtv.cominews!
articles/1627487/20091203/story.jhtml. For this initiative, MTV partnered with
Facebook, MySpace, the Family Violence Prevention Fund, WiredSafety, the Anti-
Defamation League, Blue Shield of California Foundation, LovelsRespect.org, the
National Teen Dating Abuse Helpline, the National Network to End Domestic
Violence, Liz Claiborne Inc., DoSomething.org, Break the Cycle, Ruder Finn,
Teenangels, and PBS's "Frontline." See About A Thin Line, A THIN LINE, http://
www.athinline.org/about (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
109. While the affirmative defense is available to employers in the context of vicarious
liability for supervisor misconduct in hostile work environment sexual harassment
claims (or claims in which no tangible employment action results), the presence of
employer monitoring and blocking technology is also relevant in cases of coworker
and third party sexual harassment. First, an employer can guard against harassing
conduct by subordinate or common employees using digital technology just as easily
as it can against such conduct by supervisors. It would thus appear inappropriate to
uphold the two-tiered liability for these classes. Second, as noted above, in the con-
text of coworker or third party sexual harassment, the employer is liable if it knew or
should have known of the sexual harassment and failed to take effective remedial ac-
tion. Arguably, armed with the technological capability to do so, an employer will
not be able to satisfy the first prong of this test, as it either knew or should have
known of the conduct.
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and complex array of advanced technology to monitor employees'
transmissions. Because many employers already have the ability to pre-
vent digital sexual harassment facilitated by e-mail, internet, and
desktop monitoring software, they should be required to take such
. 110
preemptive measures.
The affirmative defense should be modified in two respects in cases
of digital sexual harassment. First, it should focus on the employer's pre-
ventive efforts rather than corrective measures."' Second, it should
reduce or eliminate the employee's obligation to take advantage of these
preventive opportunities, as employees are often unaware of or unable to
access monitoring and blocking software.l 2
III. A PROPOSED TEST To ADDRESS SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN A
HOSTILE DIGITAL WORKPLACE
Courts should permit employers to plead the affirmative defense in
the digital workplace under a limited set of circumstances. Whether a
particular case falls into this category should be determined by applying
the Digital Workplace Defense Test (DWDT)."3
110. See generally Joan E. Feldman & Larry G. Johnson, Lost? No. Found? Yes. Those Com-
puter Tapes and E-mails Are Evidence, 17 GEN. PRAc. SOLO & SMALL Filu DIVISION
MAG. 2 (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/
gp-solo-magazinehome/gpsolo.magazine index/feldman.html; Matthew Fordahl,
Screening ofInstant Messaging on Rise, Cn. Tmi., Apr. 15, 2002, at 6.
111. This is not to suggest that corrective measures will no longer be relevant. In some
circumstances, an employer may have the ability to monitor digital communications
without the ability to block them. In these instances, the employer's prompt and ef-
fective action to address the conduct may demonstrate that it exercised due care.
112. Again, employee actions may nevertheless be relevant. If an employee fails to act with
reasonable care in taking advantage of other employer safeguards to either prevent
sexual harassment that could have been avoided or to notify the employer of the sex-
ual harassment, the employer's liability may be affected. In other words, while the
employee will not have access to, and will often be unaware of, the employer's moni-
toring and blocking software, the employee should still be required to exercise due
care in situations not involving an adverse or tangible employment action.
113. See supra note 41, at 90-96 (discussing the Digital Workplace Defense Test).
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FIGURE 1
DWDT ANALYSIS





Yes Technology in Place Pass Reasonable Tech
Reasonable Tech Test Allow Affirmative Defense
Presumptive Burden on D
In applying the DWDT, a court should first examine the defendant
employer's technological infrastructure to determine whether its existing
information technology was capable of monitoring and blocking the
digital communications responsible for the sexual harassment claim. If
the court ascertains that the technology lacked this capability,"' the
court should allow the defendant to plead the affirmative defense.' If
the court finds that the employer had and deployed monitoring and
blocking information technology capable of detecting and blocking con-
tent typical of sexual harassment, it must then determine whether the
employer took reasonable steps to monitor and block the communica-
tions in question. At this stage, the employer has the burden of proving
that it took reasonable efforts to prevent the communications based on
114. Companies usually block all communications that they know fall outside the bounds
of acceptable communications in the workplace and monitor employee communica-
tions. See David F. Linowes & Ray C. Spencer, Privacy: The Workplace Issue of the
'90s, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 591, 597-615 (1990) (discussing the history of suits
brought by employees for invasion of privacy); Gary T. Marx, The Case of the Omnis-
cient Organization, HARV. Bus. REv. 12 (Mar.-Apr. 1990) (describing use of new
electronic devices to monitor employees outside of traditional "workplace," including
monitoring in one's home and car). A company may elect to monitor and then block
employee communications depending on the specifics of the company information
technology policies. See Julia Turner Baumhart, The Employer's Right to Read Employ-
ee E-Mail: Protecting Property or Personal Prying?, 8 LAB. LAw. 923, 936 (1992); see
also James J. Ciapciak & Lynne Matuszak, Employer Rights in Monitoring Employee E-
Mail, FOR THE DEF., Nov. 1998, at 17, 17-20.
115. The genesis of this Article came from the Author's extensive work implementing
information technology systems, as he questioned the concept of privacy in light of
an employer's unbridled access to all digital communications that employees trans-
mitted via company system components.
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the capabilities and normal use of its information technology systems. If
the employer cannot establish that its use of monitoring and blocking
technology was reasonable, the court should deny the affirmative de-
fense.
Under the framework of this test, the availability of the affirmative
defense is contingent on the presence and use of technological systems
that are capable of monitoring and blocking digital communications. By
placing the burden on the defendant, the court would properly hold
employers responsible for the alleged hostile work environments that
they control. This approach reflects the reality that, unlike in the physi-
cal workplace, preventive measures can effectively eliminate sexual
harassment in the digital workplace.
A; Review ofan Employer's Technological Systems
In the first step of DWDT analysis, a court should determine
whether the employer's technological infrastructure had the capability to
monitor and block the particular digital communications alleged in the
plaintiff's action." To determine this, the court should explore various
aspects of a defendant's technological environment, including infrastruc-
ture and policies.'"7 The court should address six potentially applicable
issues: (1) whether the defendant routinely protects sensitive and confi-
dential information; (2) whether the defendant employs real-time
tracking technology to monitor digital activity within its infrastructure;
(3) whether the defendant tracks employee activity based on some form
of unique ID; (4) whether the defendant monitors suspicious activity;
(5) whether the defendant routinely reviews the alerts generated by its
logging systems; and (6) whether the defendant uses early end-user
monitor management technology.
First, the court should ask whether the defendant protects valuable
digital information such as financial data, customer records, or sensitive
intellectual property."' The court should be mindful that an employer
who protects its digital information is likely to monitor its web applica-
tions because early detection enables the defendant to avert serious
116. See Lynda M. Applegate, James I. Case, Jr., and D. Quinn Mills, Information Tech-
nology and Tomorrow's Manager, HIARv. Bus. REV., AT 128 (Nov.-Dec. 1988).
117. See Karen Nussbaum, Editorial, Workers Under Surveillance, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan.
6, 1992, at 21.
118. See generally Carl Botan, Communication Work and Electronic Surveillance: A Model
for Predicting Panoptic Effects, 63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 293 (1996).
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economic damage.'" For example, employers in the media industry pro-
tect their media with both physical and digital technologies, often using
some form of encryption and an access monitoring tool, to ensure that
employees do not make unauthorized copies of the media for pre-
release.
Second, the court should consider whether the defendant employs
any real-time suspicious activity and policy violation detection technol-
ogies.12 Some financial institutions, for example, implement instant
messaging systems with real-time logging capabilities' 2 ' that not only
enable the institutions to comply with the message storage requirements
that are established under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act but also allow them to
track instant message conversations as they occur.122 The court should
examine whether the defendant's inaction with respect to digital sexual
harassment is reasonable in light of the specific capabilities of its moni-
toring technology.123 When such technology is actively used, the court
should further explore the process and design of the system, focusing on
whether the defendant monitors and blocks communications.124
Third, the court should examine whether the defendant utilizes us-
er tracking technology capable of recording employees' actions with
respect to a particular Web-based tool set, such as the "research trail"
119. See generally Philip Brey, Worker Autonomy and the Drama of Digital Networks in
Organizations, 22 J. Bus. ETHICS 15 (1999); Vision & Values: Better World-Our
Commitment to Society, BRITISH TELECOM (2001), available at http://www.
btplc.com/Societyandenvironment/PDF/2001/vision-values.pdf.
120. See generally Bill Bruck, How Companies Collaborate Sharing Work Online (2001),
available at http://consortium.caucus.com/pdf/collaboration.pdf, Collaborative Strat-
egies, Electronic Collaboration on the Internet and Intranets: How Major Corporations
Are Leveraging IP Networks for Competitive Advantage (2001).
121. See Roger Harris, IM: When Time Matters, HISPANIC Bus., Nov. 2002, at 34, availa-
ble at http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/news/newsbyid.asp? id=7679&cat=Magazine
&more=/magazine.
122. See Doug Henschen, Penny Lunt Crosman and Ralph Gammon, Brave New World:
Three Trends Redefining Content Management, TRANSFORM MAG., Apr. 2004, at 16,
16-18,20-22,24.
123. See W. Michael Hoffman, Laura P. Hartman, and Mark Rowe, You've Got Mail...
and the Boss Knows: A Survey by the Center for Business Ethics of Companies' Email and
Internet Monitoring, 108 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 285, 302 (2003).
124. See generally, AMAlePolicy Inst. Research, 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance
Survey (2008), available at http://www.plattgroupllc.com/jun08/2007Electronic
MonitoringSurveillanceSurvey.pdf (citing another AMA study and stating that con-
cern "over litigation and the role electronic evidence plays in lawsuits and regulatory
investigations has spurred more employers to monitor online activity. Data security
and employee productivity concerns also motivate employers to monitor Web and e-
mail use and content. Workers' e-mail and other electronically stored information
create written business records that are the electronic equivalent of DNA evidence.").
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provided by Westlaw.125 When an employer uses such tracking devices,
the court should ascertain whether the employer could have reasonably
modified this monitoring and tracking technology to protect employees
from sexual harassment in the digital workplace.126
Fourth, the court should determine whether the defendant uses
real-time technology to monitor its systems for suspicious behavior
related to the activities of its users.127 For example, when a user mistypes
his or her password three times, the system may flag the account or send
an alert in real-time to a monitoring party. Such technology assists banks
in preventing fraud or abuse of financial accounts and is common in the
financial sector.28
Fifth, the court should review all of the defendant's logging sys-
tems. 12 Financial and medical organizations rely heavily on these
systems to access data that enables forensic computer experts to con-
struct an audit trail and deliver evidence of transactions." 0 Hospitals also
often use this technology to track the protection of patients' digital rec-
ords and demonstrate that the records are released only to authorized
. 131parties.
125. See Westlaw, http://www.westlaw.com.
126. See generally Joey F. George, Computer-Based Monitoring: Common Perceptions and
Empirical Results, 20 MIS Q. 459 (1996); Terri L. Griffith, Monitoring and Perfor-
mance: A Comparison of Computer and Supervisor Monitoring, 23 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 549 (1993).
127. See Martin Butler, Op-Ed., Staff Left in the Dark Over Monitoring Technologies,
COMPUTER WILY., May 4, 2004, at 24.
128. See generally E.L. Lesser & J. Storck, Communities of Practice and Organizational
Performance, 40 IBM Sys. J. 831 (2001).
129. See generally Simson L. Garfinkel, Op-Ed., Private Matters: Could Your Organization's
Privacy Practices Stand the Scrutiny ofa Newspaper Exposi?, CIO, Jun. 1, 2000, at 178;
Il-Horn Hann et al., Online Information Privacy: Measuring the Cost-Benefit Trade-
Off INT'L CONF. ON INFO. Sys., 2002, at 1-2, available at http://www.
comp.nus.edu.sg/-ipng/research/privacy icis.pdf.
130. See Hoffman et al., supra note 123, at 290-92.
131. V. John Ella, Unauthorized Access to Medical Records Under Company Policy and HIPAA
Supports Denial of Unemployment Benefits, WORKPLACE PRIVAcY DATA MANAGEMENT &
SECURITY REPORT (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com/ 2 011/
04/articles/hipaa- 1 /unauthorized-access-to-medical-records-under-company-policy-
and-hipaa-supports-denial-of-unemployment-benefits/; William Maruca, Calbfornia
Hospitals Fined for Employees' Unauthorized Access ofPatient Records, HIPAA, HITECH
& HIT (June 11, 2010) http://hipaahealthlaw.foxrothschild.com/2010/06/articles/
privacy/california-hospitals-fined-for-employees-unauthorized-access-of-patient-
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Sixth, the court should determine whether the defendant uses a
form of early end-user management monitoring technolo .132 This
technology monitors end-users from the end users' location. For ex-
ample, global companies with worldwide customers use tools that
monitor the location from which their customers communicate.'3 Em-
ployers frequently use this technology to ensure that employees perform
work off-site and that clients receive authorized services.'13
These six elements are intended only as guidelines for courts, since
different companies combine them uniquely and in addition to other
forms of technology.'36 Regardless of the individual characteristics of the
different tools and their uses, however, these guidelines can help deter-
mine the degree of actual tracking, monitoring, and blocking of digital
activity in light of the capabilities of an employer's particular technolog-
ical system.
Courts should apply a reasonableness standard in their analysis of
employers' blocking and monitoring capabilities. 13 7 Although a malleable
concept, courts are nonetheless often required to use a reasonableness
standard.3 8 In applying the standard to cases of digital sexual harass-
ment, courts should be mindful of the costs and efforts associated with,
and the employer's knowledge of, the employer's respective monitoring
capabilities."' More precisely, courts should make fact-specific inquiries
on a case-by-case basis, considering factors such as the size of the com-
pany, the number of employees, the ease and economy with which the
system can be used or modified to monitor and prevent sexual harass-
ment, the employer's awareness of sexual harassment acts, and the volume
of the digital transmissions the employer must track.o40 Finally, courts
132. See Jay Mellman, Where IT, Business Meet, COMM. NEWS, Aug. 2005, at 38, 39-40,
available at http://www.comnews.com/stories/articles/0805/0805where-IT.htm.
133. See id
134. See Dawn S. Onley, Technology Gives Big Brother Capability: New Technology Allows
Companies to Monitor Employees' Whereabouts to Improve Productivity, HR MAG., July
2005, at 99, 99-101.
135. See Mellman, supra note 132, at 39-40.
136. See generally Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cit. 2000); Leysia Palen & Paul
Dourish, Unpacking "Privacy" for a Networked World, 5 CHI LErrERs 129 (Apr. 5-
10, 2003), available at http://www.cs.colorado.edu/-palen/Papers/palen-dourish.pdf.
137. See generally Paul Attewell, Big Brother and the Sweatshop: Computer Surveillance in
the Automated Office, 5 Soc. THEORY 87 (1987).
138. The reasonable person standard is commonplace in tort, criminal law, and commer-
cial law. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-504 (2003) (make contract for transportation of goods
"as may be reasonable").
139. See Hoffman, supra note 123.
140. In essence, the analysis resembles a cost/benefit analysis that examines the
reasonableness of preventing sexual harassment in the context of a particular employer's
technological capabilities and current use of such technology. For example, if an
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should closely scrutinize defendants who use technology that complies
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,"' HIPAA,142 or other legislatively mandat-
ed tracking or monitoring requirements.' In such cases, monitoring
and tracking technology will almost certainly be in place.'
When a court finds that a defendant does not possess the necessary
technological infrastructure, the court should permit the defendant to
plead the affirmative defense as it currently operates, with the focus
placed on corrective procedures and preventive measures. When the in-
frastructure is in place but has not been used to prevent sexual
harassment, the affirmative defense should also be permitted, except
when the plaintiff's claim presents clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant deliberately decided not to use the existing technology.
For example, if a plaintiff produces e-mails establishing that the decision
was driven by a desire to avoid losing the right to plead the affirmative
defense, the court should deny the defendant the right to assert the af-
firmative defense notwithstanding the technological systems in place.
This exception is necessary because courts should sanction defendants
who purposely expose their employees to a hostile digital workplace.
After finding that the defendant's infrastructure was capable of blocking
and monitoring the alleged digital communications, the court must
then determine whether the defendant took reasonable steps to block or
monitor the communications.'
employer currently uses e-mail monitoring technology and would not incur
additional cost to monitor e-mails for inappropriate and offensive communications, it
would be reasonable to impute liability or limit the employer's ability to use an
affirmative defense.
141. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 USC, and 18 USC)
142. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.,
and 42 U.S.C.).
143. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
144. See generally Jeremy U. Blackowicz, Note, E-Mail Disclosure to Third Parties in the
Private Sector Workplace, 7 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 80 (2001).
145. See e.g., Doe v. XYC Corp, 887 A.2d 1156, (N.J. 2005). In Doe, the court looked
into three areas to determine if the monitoring was legal. First, the court looked to
whether the employer had the capability to monitor. See id. at 1164 (holding that the
suspect's "immediate supervisor, [searched through the employee's] computer while
he was at lunch and clicked on 'websites visited.' . .. [N]one of the sites identified
were actually explored and no further action was taken to determine the nature of
Employee's pornographic related computer activities. Instead, [the supervisor] was
simply instructed to tell Employee to stop whatever he was doing. Thus, defendant's
capability to monitor Employee's activities on his work computer was clearly estab-
lished."). The court then looked to whether the employee had a legitimate
expectation of privacy. See id. at 1166 (finding that the employee's "office, as with
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B. Determination of Whether the Employer Took Reasonable
Efforts to Prevent the Receipt or Transmission of
the Digital Communications
In the second step of the DWDT analysis, the court should use the
information acquired in the first step to determine whether the compa-
ny took reasonable measures to track digital communications unrelated
to the sexually harassing communications. The court may find it appro-
priate to appoint an independent third party, similar to an expert called
to resolve digital discovery disputes, to determine whether the defendant
used its existing technology in a reasonable manner to protect the digital
workplace. As mentioned above, the court must perform fact-specific
analysis in each case, considering both fiscal costs and corporate policies,
to determine the practicability of the defendant's implementation of its
technological system.
CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment and hostile work environments violate an indi-
vidual's right not to suffer discrimination in the workplace. Because
employers cannot control the actions of all their employees, business
associates, or customers and cannot compel them use their preventive
procedures, the Supreme Court adopted equitable principles in permit-
ting an affirmative defense. Today, however, courts have yet to fully
appreciate an employer's ability to take reasonable preventive measures
to protect the digital workplace."' This creates a disincentive for em-
ployers use of these digital measures and is inconsistent with the
congressional mandate to prioritize avoiding harm over the providing
others in the same area, did not have a door and his computer screen was visible from
the hallway, unless he took affirmative action to block it. Under those circumstances,
we readily conclude that Employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy that
would prevent his employer from accessing his computer to determine if he was using
it to view adult or child pornography."). Finally, the court analyzed whether the em-
ployer had a right to search the office to investigate an employee's computer use. See
id. at 1166 (concluding that the employer, "through its supervisory/management per-
sonnel, was on notice that Employee was viewing pornography on his computer and,
indeed, that this included child pornography [and thus had a duty to investigate].").
146. See, e.g., Adam C. Losey, Clicking Away Confidentiality: Workplace Waiver ofAttorney-
Client Privilege, 60 FLA. L. REv. 1179 (2008); Cicero H. Brabham, Jr., Note, Curi-
ouser and Curiouser: Are Employers the Modern Day Alice in Wonderland? Closing the
Ambiguity in Federal Privacy Law as Employers Cyber-Snoop Beyond the Workplace, 62
RUTGERS L. REV. 993 (2010).
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redress."' Given employers' expansive monitoring of employees' digital
communications in general, it is reasonable for courts to require the
monitoring of communications that are of a sexually harassing nature.
The courts, therefore, should modify the affirmative defense to ensure
protection of the workplace for employees and to create an effective legal
framework to address digital sexual harassment claims.t
147. Employer reasons for monitoring are diverse and important:
Electronic monitoring allows employers to make significant gains in
the areas of productivity, quality, and safety. Monitoring enhances produc-
tivity by facilitating more efficient resource scheduling, more immediate
feedback, and more meaningful evaluations. Quality likewise is improved,
and customers benefit from better service and lower prices. Monitoring is
key to some safety initiatives, and better safety means lower insurance pre-
miums and workers' compensation payouts. Payroll and equipment costs
can also be reduced by monitoring employees for personal use of company
equipment and for taking excessive breaks. It has been estimated that em-
ployees wasted 170 billion dollars of employer time in one year alone.
Further savings may be realized by curbing theft and legal liability.
In one year, it is estimated that employees stole the equivalent of 370
billion dollars from their employers. Monitoring can be used to detect ille-
gal or wrongful deeds so that the offenders may be punished. For example,
the data flow in and out of a company can be watched to find employees
transmitting sensitive data or hackers attempting to crack into the system.
E-mail within the workplace also can be monitored to detect electronic
harassment. Alternately, monitoring may be used proactively to minimize
respondeat superior liability to detect a problem before it happens. As a final
incentive, the law sometimes requires employers to monitor employees.
Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles Examination of
Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FA. L. REv. 289, 319-20 (2002) (citations
omitted). See also Jill S. Chanen, The Boss is Watching, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2008, at 48,
available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the-boss-is-watching/
(discussing the multitude of issues facing employers and employees with workplace
privacy and monitoring).
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